How did Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika affect Soviet support of Marxist revolution in the Third World? In this book, four experts on Soviet-Third World relations take a sharp-eyed look at the role the former Soviet Union played in providing assistance to Marxist revolutionaries and assess the changes in policy that occurred under Gorbachev's leadership. Often the Soviet Union pursued a patient strategy of providing relatively limited amounts of military assistance to revolutionary movements to ensure that they would not be defeated. Even when revolutionaries were able to seize power without a surge of Soviet military support, the Marxist movements often required substantial military assistance from the USSR and other communist states to stay in power. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union realized that its previous support for revolution had saddled it with the burden of propping up weak Marxist regimes and undermined efforts to achieve detente with the United States. Gorbachev then acted to reduce the political and economic cost of supporting Marxist third world regimes. The authors' essays offer a detailed and challenging analysis of the complexities that have defined the Soviet Union's support of Marxist revolutions in the past and will shape future Soviet policy.

Mark Katz's highly readable and useful overview of Soviet military interest in the Third World will be an important resource for anyone doing research in this field.

"Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director for East-West Relations, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State"

In his timely and thoughtful assessment of GorbacheV's evolving military policy, Mark Katz cautions against concluding that Moscow has lost interest in retaining and acquiring positions of influence in areas such as Angola, the Arab world, Ethiopia, and Central America. By detailing for us the new thinking' in Moscow, and the new policies that it has spawned in the USSR's Third World Policy, he has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the challenge that Gorbachev poses to the United States. "Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania"

This book examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet military policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev. Mark Katz studies GorbacheV's active pursuit of detente with the West in terms of his ambitious economic reform efforts. Katz maintains that since Gorbachev regards detente as so essential for the achievement of perestroika, he has adopted a less aggressive military policy in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet military statements since Gorbachev came to power, which indicate that the Soviet military, for the most part, does not oppose GorbacheV's retrenchment from the Third World. The Soviet military even seems to approve the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The author points out that while Gorbachev has de-emphasized the expansion of MoscoW's base network in the Third World, he has vigorously sought to reduce U.S. military access to it. Gorbachev has attempted to do this through a stepped-up diplomatic campaign to convince moderate Third World states that the Soviet Union is not their enemy and hence there is no need to ally with Washington against Moscow. Katz also analyzes the Soviet support of regional security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Katz maintains that if these security proposals are accepted, U.S. military access to them would definitely be reduced and that the Soviets' de-emphasis on obtaining new bases could mean that moderate Third World governments may become more amenable to accepting these regional security proposals.

As the United States withdraws its combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, politicians, foreign policy specialists, and the public are worrying about the consequences of leaving these two countries. Neither nation can be considered stable, and progress toward democracy in them-a principal aim of America and the West-is fragile at best. But, international relations scholar Mark N. Katz asks: Could ending both wars actually help the United States and its allies to overcome radical Islam in the long term? Drawing lessons from the Cold War, Katz makes the case that rather than signaling the decline of American power and influence, removing military forces from Afghanistan and Iraq puts the U.S. in a better position to counter the forces of radical Islam and ultimately win the war on terror. He explains that since both wars will likely remain intractable, for Washington to remain heavily involved in either is counter-productive. Katz argues that looking to its Cold War experience would help the U.S. find better strategies for employing America's scarce resources to deal with its adversaries now. This means that, although leaving Afghanistan and Iraq may well appear to be a victory for America's opponents in the short term-as was the case when the U.S. withdrew from Indochina-the larger battle with militant Islam can be won only by refocusing foreign and military policy away from these two quagmires. This sober, objective assessment of what went wrong in the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ways the West can disentangle itself and still move forward draws striking parallels with the Cold War. Anyone concerned with the future of the War on Terror will find Katz's argument highly thought provoking.

As the United States withdraws its combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, politicians, foreign policy specialists, and the public are worrying about the consequences of leaving these two countries. Neither nation can be considered stable, and progress toward democracy in them--a principal aim of America and the West--is fragile at best. But, international relations scholar Mark N. Katz asks: Could ending both wars actually help the United States and its allies to overcome radical Islam in the long term?

Drawing lessons from the Cold War, Katz makes the case that rather than signaling the decline of American power and influence, removing military forces from Afghanistan and Iraq puts the U.S. in a better position to counter the forces of radical Islam and ultimately win the war on terror. He explains that since both wars will likely remain intractable, for Washington to remain heavily involved in either is counter-productive. Katz argues that looking to its Cold War experience would help the U.S. find better strategies for employing America's scarce resources to deal with its adversaries now. This means that, although leaving Afghanistan and Iraq may well appear to be a victory for America's opponents in the short term--as was the case when the U.S. withdrew from Indochina--the larger battle with militant Islam can be won only by refocusing foreign and military policy away from these two quagmires.

This sober, objective assessment of what went wrong in the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ways the West can disentangle itself and still move forward draws striking parallels with the Cold War. Anyone concerned with the future of the War on Terror will find Katz's argument highly thought provoking.

Although the causes of revolution are often internal, the occurrence of revolution has serious international consequences: existing alliances are upset, the importance of small and weak countries may be magnified, and serious efforts may be required to prevent the export of revolutions to other countries. Mark N. Katz brings together twelve readings from an impressive group of scholars that shed light on this important link between revolution and international relations. Katz introduces students to the ways in which revolution has impacted the international system and to key terms so they are better prepared to critically read and analyze the selections that follow. A distinctive feature of this collection-and one guaranteed to spark lively classroom discussion-is the inclusion of contending views in each part that explore a particular issue. The readings in Part I, for example, present differing arguments on why the link between revolution and international conflict exists or how it occurs. The authors excerpted in Part III disagree about the success or failure of democratization as a means to preempt revolution. And the final section offers opposing views as to the future impact of revolution on the international system. Abundant pedagogy throughout the volume guides students through each reading. Both a general and part introductions frame the readings while selection headnotes and critical thinking questions offer background information and underscore important cross-cutting themes. In addition, an annotated list of suggested readings points students toward resources for further study and research.

Mark Katz's highly readable and useful overview of Soviet military interest in the Third World will be an important resource for anyone doing research in this field. Francis Fukuyama, Deputy Director for East-West Relations, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State In his timely and thoughtful assessment of Gorbachev's evolving military policy, Mark Katz cautions against concluding that Moscow has lost interest in retaining and acquiring positions of influence in areas such as Angola, the Arab world, Ethiopia, and Central America. By detailing for us the `new thinking' in Moscow, and the new policies that it has spawned in the USSR's Third World Policy, he has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the challenge that Gorbachev poses to the United States. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania This book examines the changes that have occurred in Soviet military policy toward the Third World under Gorbachev. Mark Katz studies Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West in terms of his ambitious economic reform efforts. Katz maintains that since Gorbachev regards detente as so essential for the achievement of perestroika, he has adopted a less aggressive military policy in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet military statements since Gorbachev came to power, which indicate that the Soviet military, for the most part, does not oppose Gorbachev's retrenchment from the Third World. The Soviet military even seems to approve the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. The author points out that while Gorbachev has de-emphasized the expansion of Moscow's base network in the Third World, he has vigorously sought to reduce U.S. military access to it. Gorbachev has attempted to do this through a stepped-up diplomatic campaign to convince moderate Third World states that the Soviet Union is not their enemy and hence there is no need to ally with Washington against Moscow. Katz also analyzes the Soviet support of regional security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Katz maintains that if these security proposals are accepted, U.S. military access to them would definitely be reduced and that the Soviets' de-emphasis on obtaining new bases could mean that moderate Third World governments may become more amenable to accepting these regional security proposals.